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Abstract
Statutory parental leave provisions in the UK are amongst the least generous as compared
to other EU and OECD countries2. That is why most companies and other institutions, such
as universities, top these legal provisions up with more generous occupational parental
leave packages (OMPs). Yet, they don’t do so uniformly. Indeed, the generosity of OMPs
offered by HEIs across the UK differ greatly. This paper examines both theoretically and
empirically why this is the case. We find that income of HEIs doesn’t make a difference
but size in terms of number of employees as well as the student-to-staff ratio do. Our results
also show that more research intense universities with a higher previous share of female
professors and female academics at child-bearing age provide more generous maternity
pay. We offer a range of explanations for these findings.
1 List of authors is alphabetical implying equal authorship
2 With respect to generosity of maternity pay the UK is the second lowest in the EU, only Ireland provides
less generous maternity pay. And in terms of public expenditure on maternity leave per child born only
Greece and the Netherlands spend less (figures from 2013, OECD Health Expenditure and Family
Databases).
21. Introduction
If you are an academic, you are a woman and you want to have children, your maternity
leave provisions depend dramatically on the higher education institution that employs you
in the UK. Maternity leave arrangements vary widely across UK universities and this
variation does not rest on intuitive differences, such as universities’ budget and size. The
number of weeks for which full salary replacement is granted to women on maternity leave
varies from 0 – or just statutory maternity pay (e.g. Leeds Metropolitan University) to 26
weeks (e.g. Manchester University). Places as diverse as Bristol, Kent or Goldsmith
College only grant 8 weeks of fully paid maternity leave compared to the 18 weeks of full
salary replacements provided by Keele University or Cambridge University, inter alia. In
addition, not all women in the academic ranks are entitled to similar maternity leave
policies. Staff on fixed-term contracts, such as researchers and teaching fellows are
frequently excluded from most of the maternity schemes outside the statutory provisions
because they often require a prolonged period of service to become eligible for
occupational maternity packages3.
This article analyses the determinants of maternity leaves’ generosity in 160 UK
universities.4 We find that universities granting favorable maternity provisions are
characterized by a higher number of women in higher academic ranks (such as full
3 Most occupational maternity packages (namely, 127 packages in our sample) require continuous
employment for at least 52 weeks at 15 weeks prior to expected childbirth. This is longer than the typical
fixed term contract that lasts or 12 months or just an academic year.
4 We focus on the generosity of occupational maternity pay because the length does not vary and is
determined by the statutory provision that a job has to be held for 52 weeks after childbirth.
3professors), a lower student-to-staff ratio and a high level of research intensity. We link
these findings to the institutional structures across HEIs that increase women’s bargaining
power, lower the costs of granting more generous maternity policies, and affect the
employer’s incentives to keep female academics attached to the university.
Our work contributes to the literature on the determinants of maternity provisions across
institutions and organizations. Alike this literature, we show that the presence of women in
top-positions is a likely predictor of the generosity of maternity benefits across UK
universities. Unlike this literature, we show that universities’ budgets and financial
resources do not matter for the variation in the generosity of maternity provisions; rather,
the number of students per academic members of staff and the research intensity of
universities, are important conditions for granting favorable maternity policies to academic
women. Our research also adds to the larger debate on women’s under-representation in
qualified and competitive sectors by highlighting the institutional-based constraints and
incentives offered to women in the UK academic sector.
This paper is structured as follows: the next section summarizes the main findings
advanced by the literature on maternity policies across firms and organizations. We build
on these works to advance our own hypotheses on the determinants of maternity
arrangements in UK higher education institutions (HEIs) in section three. The data,
variables and research design are described in section four. Section five discusses the
results of our empirical analysis, while the last section concludes and points to future
research avenues.
2. Variation in Maternity benefits
4Most countries impose legal minimum standards on maternity leave provisions.
Organizations then decide whether to grant additional – so called contractual or
occupational - benefits to their workforce. In many countries, especially those with
relatively large social welfare states such as Germany, France and the Scandinavian
countries, statutory maternity provisions are generous enough for companies not to offer
additional provisions. This is different for the UK where statutory benefits are very meagre:
the UK offers the second least generous maternity pay in the EU, only Ireland provides less
generous maternity pay. And in terms of public expenditure on maternity leave per child
born only Greece and the Netherlands spend less5. Most companies, universities, and civil
service institutions, therefore, offer additional maternity leave and pay to mothers.
This decision to top up legal requirements is usually regarded as the result of a cost-benefit
analysis. Generous maternity provisions attract and retain female talents, minimize the
costs of recruitment and training, reduce the costs of absenteeism and sick leaves, enhance
job satisfaction, increase employees’ loyalty and productivity and improve the corporate
image of the providing institution (Yasbek 2004). But there are also costs: monetary costs,
such as payments for maternal and parental leaves, costs associated with temporarily filling
the posts of absentees, costs generated by productivity breaks due to the personnel on leave,
and costs of adjustment in implementing work-life balance policies. Given than the costs
are more directly measurable and observable than the benefits, companies and institutions
have traditionally regarded maternity leaves and, more generally, work-life balance
5 figures from 2013, OECD Health Expenditure and Family Databases.
5provisions as impediments to their profits and growth (Bevan 2001). A countervailing
factor against a pure analysis of costs and benefits is the share of women in executive
positions, which has consistently been associated with generous maternity policies in both
for-profit and non-profit organizations (Pitt-Catsouphes et al. 2004; Galinksy and Bond,
1998; Konrad and Mangel, 2000).
Recently, high-tech consumer companies (such as Google, Netflix and Microsoft),
consulting firms, law and financial services are increasingly using generous maternity
leaves, as well as child bonuses and family friendly arrangements, to attract and retain
productive workers, on the understanding that the conditions granted to employees are
important predictors of firms’ performances (Huselid, Jackson and Schuler, 1995). The
“business case” for generous provisions does not hold equally across sectors and between
organizations. Typically, work-life balance policies are more generous across sectors
competing for a qualified workforce (Konrad and Mangel, 2000; Evans 2001, Sprang,
Rompf, and Anderson 2000). Finance, insurance and real estate sectors, for example, grant
more generous policies than retail, construction and wholesale industries.
Favorable arrangements are also prevalent in public sector jobs (Evans 2001) and that is
usually attributed to the relative bargaining power of public sector employees, who are very
likely to belong to trade unions or professional organizations.
Along with industry’s type, the size and economic capacity of organizations and
institutions account for a large part of the variation in maternity provisions. Large firms
(with more that 1000 employees) grant more generous policies than small and medium
enterprises, which is usually regarded as an effect of economies of scale, where the fixed
cost of family-friendly provisions can be spread over a larger level of output (Comfort,
6Johnson and Wallace, 2003). Much less is known about small and medium enterprises
because of data limitation and inconsistencies in the definition of this category across
countries.6
Our paper provides a different theoretical framework to understand maternity leave
provisions. Rather than a cost-benefit analysis, we assume that, like most policy decisions,
maternity leaves in U.K. universities are the result of bargaining between human resources
and interested parties. We offer better theoretical underpinning and clearer comparative
statics for the main determinants of maternity policies using the insights from the literature
on organizations’ work-life balance provisions.
3. Variation in maternity provisions across UK universities: theoretical
intuitions
Based on the above discussion, we posit that maternity leave provisions result from an
implicit or explicit negotiation between the organization board and the bargaining units
representing the employees. In the context of UK universities, the two sides involved in
this bargaining process are university management and female employees. Within this
framework, we obtain clear predictions. First, factors which raise the bargaining power of
women employees, especially academic women, increase maternity benefits. Second,
determinants which augment the cost of providing maternity benefits decrease the
6 SMEs are less likely to have formal or stated work-life balance policies and the extent of these
provisions is less likely to be captured by surveys. In addition, the definition of SMEs varies across
countries (from 250-500 employees in the UK to 5-25 employees in New Zealand) and this prevents
a systematic comparison of SMEs’ policies across countries.
7generosity of maternity provisions.7 And third, factors that increase the institution’s
benefits from retaining mothers in the workforce will also favor greater generosity of
maternity pay.
Since the theoretically described bargaining process is rather implicit we talked to several
Human Resources Directors across UK HEIs to understand how university management
implements changes in occupational parental leave policies. Whenever there is a need to
revise the OMP, e.g. when there are changes in statutory provisions or government
promotes gender oriented activities such as the Athena Swan or Gender Equality mark
programs, the respective Human Resources team will review the current provisions and
propose potential changes to the relevant university bodies (council, senate, management
team). This proposal is usually based on the following (and other) considerations8:
1. What are the benefits for recruitment and retention of staff
2. Benchmarking to competitor institutions, e.g. other universities (Russell
Group), or respected employers in public and civil service for professional staff
3. Feedback from employees through e.g. a survey
4. Consultation with relevant groups of staff (e.g. female professors)
5. Issues raised through initiatives such as Athena Swan (this is more recent)
6. Finally, a business case has to be provided that considers costs vs. benefits
Two conditions are likely to affect the bargaining power and influence of women in the
academic sector, namely the number of women with full professorship and the share of
7 Both sets of predictions are consistent with an asymmetric Nash-bargaining protocol among others.
8 We interviewed amongst others the Director of Human Resources at Warwick University, Gillian
McGrattan.
8female academics at child bearing age. Arguably, women in higher academic positions are
more likely to influence the policy choices set at university level given that full professors
participate in university committees that decide on policies and strategies. Since women
have a vested interest in better work-life-balance provisions, we argue that a larger share
of female professors involved in university policy making, affects generosity of
occupational maternity packages positively. Similarly, the generosity of maternity leaves
is expected to increase with a higher share of academic women at child bearing age. These
women in particular have an interest in generous maternity benefits because they are face
with the decision to start or enlarge their family. These views enter the “bargaining
process” through the mentioned feedback and consultancy mechanisms that inform the
proposal generated by human resources departments. Universities with a higher share of
female professors and female academics at child bearing age are therefore expected to
adopt more generous maternity policies.
Turning to costs, we identify three restraints on the generosity of maternity provisions:
financial resources, workforce composition, and student-to-staff ratio. One intuitive
difference between higher education institutions rests on their financial resources. Some
universities are richer than others and can grant more generous leaves to their employees.
Similarly, large universities (in terms of total number of staff) are expected to offer more
favorable leaves. As for big enterprises, the fixed cost of maternity leave provisions for
academic staff and IT systems in large universities can be spread over a larger level of
output compared to smaller universities. Large and rich universities are therefore expected
to grant more generous work-life balance provisions.
9A further aspect that HR administrations are likely to consider in designing
maternity schemes is the admin-to-academics ratio. The levels of education, training,
qualification and skills required for administrative works are arguably lower than those
necessary to become an academic. While differences in skills and qualifications usually
translate in different salary schemes, institutions cannot discriminate female academics and
female support staff in granting maternity provisions (and rightly so). We posit that
universities employing a higher number of (female) administrative staff (to total member
of academic staff) are likely to grant relatively less generous maternity policies. As for
retail, construction and wholesale industries, the presence of less qualified workforce in
universities with a higher proportion of support staff is likely to push down the maternity
benefits granted to female employees. We therefore expect that the generosity of maternity
arrangements is likely to decrease as the ratio between academics and administrative staff
increases.
In addition, universities invest a lot of resources into the recruitment of academics and their
productivity. For example, early career academics are supplied with resources to build up
their research profiles through attending academic conferences, reductions in teaching and
administrative loads, and funds to start new research agendas. These investments would be
lost if young female academics did not return from maternity leaves to being research active
and productive. Hence, universities – especially research oriented ones – have greater
incentives to grant generous maternity pay when the share of female academics at child
bearing age is larger.
The skill specificity of academic jobs is much more pronounced than for administrative
jobs. An administrator in a biology department can relatively easily move across to a
10
similar job in the Humanities of Social Sciences while a sociologist can hardly do the job
of a biologist. Also the investment in skills and productivity of female academics is much
higher than for female administrators. Finally, comparing sheer numbers of female
academics and administrators – the supply of female academics (especially at more senior
levels) is much lower. As a consequence, it is much harder to replace an academic mother
not returning to her job after maternity than a mother in an administrative capacity. We
therefore posit that the bargaining process in geared toward female academics much more
so than administrators and we expect that generosity of maternity pay is not influences but
the share of senior female administrators or female administrative staff at child bearing
age.
In addition, we speculate that maternity allowances are likely to depend on differences
between the students-to-staff ratio across universities. If we assume that teaching, admin,
pastoral care and supervision duties are equally shared among members, as the students-
to-staff ratio increases, that is the number of students per academic member of staff
becomes higher, the absence on leave of any academic generates high levels of workload
for all the remaining ones. By way of example, suppose there are 20 students allocated
across 10 members of staff. If one member leaves, the costs for each member of staff, in
terms of workload, are negligible compared to a case where 20 students have to be allocated
among 4 members only. In this latter case, each academic member becomes highly
indispensable and generous leave policies become costlier in terms of re-allocation of
pastoral, teaching and supervision tasks among other academics. We expect that
universities with a higher students-to-staff ratio are therefore less generous in granting
maternity leaves compared to universities with lower students-to-staff ratios.
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Our discussion of the determinants of maternity provisions across higher education
institutions in the UK has identified a number of factors that are either likely to increase
the bargaining power of women in academia (i.e. number of female professors and the
levels of unionization) or to increase the costs of generous provisions across institutions
(i.e. university income, size, admin-to-academics ratio and student-to-staff ratio). There is,
however, an additional factor, ingrained in the UK academic system, which affects both
women’s bargaining power and the incentives for universities to retain productive mothers,
the research intensity of the institution, usually measured through it’s performance in the
periodically returning research excellence framework (REF).
The REF – Research Excellence Framework9 – is an assessment of the quality of British
higher education institutions in terms of both their research outputs (e.g. publications,
performances, and dissemination) and the impact beyond academia of the research
produced. REF scores serve both as benchmarks for the allocation of public investments in
research activities and as indicators of the quality of research carried out across British
universities. Higher scores in the REF entails larger amount of funding and higher
reputational returns for the academic institutions.
We argue that REF scores are important predictors of the generosity of maternity policies
offered to women in academia for two reasons. First, research intensive universities (high
REF scores) engage in a higher level of screening during hiring procedures, which select
high-quality and high-productivity academic profiles (researchers who publish four-stars
9 Formerly, RAE – Research Assessment Exercise. The RAE was replaced by the REF in 2014.
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or three-stars articles or high-impact scholars, to use the language of the REF). Given the
high costs of recruitment, highly ranked universities have greater incentives to retain
productive scholars by “rewarding” them with additional benefits, inter alia more generous
maternity provisions for highly productive female academics. Second, highly productive
academics are also more likely to be poached by competing universities and obtain outside
offers, which increase their bargaining power. Both effects lead to the same predictions,
namely that research intense universities have more generous maternity policies in place
than less research oriented academic institutions. This also supports our previous argument
that generosity of maternity pay does depend on female academics more than on female
administrators.
Finally, following our discussions with HR directors, universities undertake benchmarking
exercises with regard to competitor institutions. This is particularly important for
recruitment and retention of academic staff because of the skill specificity of academic jobs
and the amount of resources universities invest in the productivity of research active staff.
The majority of administrative jobs requires much less skill specificity and the share of
very high level administrative jobs is relatively small. We thus focus on peer groups within
the higher education sector. Universities across the UK have self-selected into formal and
informal associations according to their research activities, teaching aims, research grants,
contract income and entry requirements, inter alia. The Russell Group, founded in 1994
and based in London, is arguably the most known HEIs association comprising of 24
13
universities, but many other formal and informal university groupings exist in the UK.10
The purpose of these affiliations is to represent the interests of member institutions and
promote their shared values. For example, the “Golden Triangle” is an unofficial grouping
of elite universities located in the English cities of Cambridge, London and Oxford. Golden
Triangle universities11 are similar in terms of their huge financial endowments, obtaining
the highest research incomes of all British HEIs and have implemented a high number of
joint research programs. Russell Group members are public high intense research
universities which receive approximately two thirds of all university research grant and
contract income, award 60% of all doctorates gained in the UK, host over 30% of all
overseas (outside the EU) students studying in the UK, and generated 68% 4-star outputs12
in the 2008 and 2014 research assessment exercise (RAE/REF). Albeit with some
differences, group membership signals similarities between affiliated institutions. For
example, the Million+ Group13 specializes in courses on modern subjects and professional
qualification while the Russell Group or the 1994 group 14 are more centered on traditional
subjects. The “new universities”, also called post-1992 universities or modern universities,
is a group of former polytechnics and central institutions that were given university status
through the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, as well as institutions that have been
10 See Appendix for a detailed list of the universities belonging to different groups, we list the 14 most
important groups that are also used in the empirical analysis.
11 Golden triangle HEIs are Cambridge University, Oxford University, London School of Economics,
Imperial College London, King’s College London and University College London (sometimes London
Business School and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine are also mentioned as members).
12 Publications that were deemed world leading by the REF panel.
13 The group was founded in 1997 as the Coalition of Modern Universities. It changed its name to the
Campaign for Mainstream Universities in 2004 and then again in November 2007, to the Million+ Group.
14 The 1994 group was formed in 1994 to represent smaller research-intensive universities following the
Russell Group foundation. The 1994 dissolved in 2013 and its members merged into the Russell Group.
14
granted university status since 1992 without receiving a royal charter. Especially new
universities that were not former polytechnics – such as Anglia Ruskin, Birmingham City,
Coventry, Oxford Brookes, or Sheffield Hallam University without a royal charter were
only granted to power to award taught degrees but not research degrees. These universities
are therefore much more teaching oriented and much less research intense.
The classification of universities in groups allows advancing some further predictions on
the determinants of maternity schemes. We argue that “peer” universities (i.e. HEIs
affiliated to the same group) are likely to offer similar maternity provisions, which is likely
to lead to convergence within groups and divergence of maternity arrangements between
groups. The logic underlying this prediction rests on the assumption that universities
belonging to the same group also compete with each other in terms of staff recruitment,
which is essential for achieving the goals set by their respective affiliations. For example,
to maintain their leadership in research grants, golden triangle HEIs must keep attracting
leading scholars by offering favorable working conditions. Along with contract income,
research budgets and teaching workload, generous maternity leaves are one of the
instrument HEIs can use to attract highly skilled scholars. All these policies are costly and
are very likely to be correlated with universities characteristics (i.e. budget, size,
academics/admin and students/academic ratios, and unionization levels). However, peer
universities would have an incentive to push up the working conditions offered to existing
or potential staff members but not unconditionally (given that these policies are costly).
Rather they would adjust the benefits offered by their schemes up to the level guaranteed
by similar HEIs, thus reducing the gap between similarly attractive universities for
candidate scholars. Given that academic institutions are not identical and the cost of
15
maternity schemes is different across universities, we expect to see similar maternity
arrangements within similar academic institutions and dissimilar provisions between
different universities while university characteristics would account for the remaining
variation. We thus expect maternity provisions in goal oriented groups and high research
intense associations such as the Russell Group and the Golden Triangle to be on average
more generous and more similar, i.e. the variance of these maternity benefits is smaller.
For less research intense and more diverse groups such as the Million+ and especially the
post-1992 non-polytechnics universities we expect more divers and less generous
maternity pay provisions.
3.a. Summary of Hypotheses
We have argued that the generosity of maternity leaves across UK universities increases as
the bargaining power of women increases and the costs of maternity leaves decrease. The
number of female professors and the levels of unionization enhance women’s bargaining
positions, whereas university income, size, admin-to-academics ratio and student-to-staff
ratio increase the costs of granting favorable maternity policies. Finally, the generosity of
maternity leaves is likely to increase in research oriented universities, where women have
more bargaining power and the costs of generous policies are offset by the higher returns
of hiring highly productive researchers. We derive nine testable hypotheses:
H1: The larger the previous share of female full professors in a university, the more
generous is the provision of maternity policies.
H2: The higher the share of female academics at child bearing age, the more generous the
maternity pay.
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H3: The higher the universities’ budget, the more generous is the provision of maternity
leave policies.
H4: The larger the size - in terms of employees - of universities, the more generous is the
provision of maternity leave policies.
H5: The higher the academic-to-admin ratio, the more generous is the provision of
maternity leave policies.
H6: The higher the student-to-staff ratio in a university, the less generous is the provision
of maternity leave policies.
H7: The higher the research intensity of the university, the more generous is the provision
of maternity leave policies.
H8: Maternity provisions are likely to be more similar within homogeneous peer institution
groups.
4. Data and Empirical Analysis
4.a. Variation of maternity leaves across UK universities
In the UK, women employees are entitled to Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) if they have
worked for the same employer continuously for at least 26 weeks up to the 15th week
before the expected week of childbirth and they earn on average at least £109 a week.
Women that qualify for the SMP are paid the 90% of the average weekly earnings (before
tax) for the first 6 weeks and the lower of £140.98 or 90% of the average weekly earnings
for the next 33 weeks.
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Given the meagre benefits granted through statutory maternity pay to women in the UK
(vis-à-vis other European countries),15 most UK universities provide an extra Occupational
Maternity Pay (OMP) that tops up the Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) in the first 39 weeks
of maternity leave. The eligibility criterion to access the OMP usually depends on the
length of service and both the payment and the eligibility criteria vary across institutions.
For example, the University of Liverpool’s OMP, regardless of the length of service, allows
for full salary replacement for the first 8 weeks, half salary plus the SMP rate for the next
16 weeks and only the SMP for the last 15 weeks of ordinary maternity leave. The London
School of Economics and Political Science instead pays full salary replacement for the first
18 weeks and the SMP (at the lowest rate) for the last 21 weeks, if the woman has been
employed for at least 26 continuous weeks before the expected date of childbirth.
Other universities may offer different OMP payments schemes that either depend on the
length of service of the employee (in such cases the employee cannot choose the OMP she
prefers), or may not depend on eligibility criteria and the employee is free to choose
between different salary replacement schemes. For instance, at the University of Durham
women can choose, if they satisfy the unique eligibility criterion, the salary replacement
scheme they prefer during the ordinary maternity leave period.
There are two types of schemes in cases where universities offer more than one
occupational maternity package. Type one consists of HEIs offering different maternity
packages where one is more generous in terms of salary replacement than the other. This
15 See OECD Family Database www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm for a summary of maternity
and parental leave provision by country.
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is usually dependent on different eligibility criteria, e.g. longer service is required for the
more generous package. Type two involves HEIs offering different packages that are
roughly similar in terms of monetary value but entail a trade-off between salary and time,
namely between a higher level of salary replacement for a shorter period of time and a
longer but less paid leave.16 The choice between the two packages is usually not determined
by different eligibility criteria.
Only 30 out of the 160 HEIs, for which data on occupational maternity benefits was
available, offer more than 1 package - usually 2. Only 8 of the universities with different
packages have different eligibility criteria for the different schemes, typically they require
a longer period of service to become eligible for more generous maternity pay17. In the
other 22 cases the two (or more) schemes require the same length of prior employment and
have the same monetary value but the maternity pay is split up into different periods with
full or partial salary replacement, e.g. 8 weeks of full pay plus 16 weeks of half pay vs. 16
weeks of full pay (e.g. University of Warwick).
4.b. Data
16 Research shows that, high replacement incomes are beneficial to mothers’ employment rates and their
attachment to the labour market in the short run (Waldfogel et al. 1999; Winegarden and Bracy 1995; Ruhm
1998) but long leaves depreciate the human-capital of female workers and jeopardize their employment
prospects, in the long run (Ruhm 1998; Pylkkaenen and Smith 2003; Stoiber 1990; Beblo and Wolf 2002;
Wetzels and Tijdens 2002). Also, women career breaks affect their productivity levels and earning capacity,
thus increasing the gender wage gap and the unequal treatment of women in the labour market (Klerman and
Leibowitz 1997; Ondrich et al. 1996, Pe ´rivier 2004; Fagnani 1996).
17 Unfortunately, we do not have enough variation across eligibility criteria to statistically explore eligibility
as a potential screening mechanism but it is usually the case the more generous maternity pay requires a
longer employment to become eligible, e.g. 52 weeks vs. 104 weeks of continuous employment before the
15th week of expected childbirth.
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Arguably the best indicator for the generosity of maternity benefits is the number of weeks
full salary replacement is paid. On the one hand, if women can take more time out of work
– without income cuts – they are certainly advantaged in terms of adapting to their
motherhood status without being pressured by income concerns or the need to multitask
administration, teaching and research tasks. This increases the probability that women
return to their research position without having to take a career break and with possibly
minor effects on research and publication activity. On the other hand, salary replacement
represents the most costly part of maternity packages for universities.
Indeed looking at generosity of maternity pay across British HEIs reveals a large variance
across universities which cannot only be explained by different financial constraints faced
by the HEI. We collected data on occupational maternity provisions for 214 different
packages across 160 different UK HEIs. Table 1 gives a summary of our main measure of
generosity – weeks with full salary replacement18.
Table 1: Generosity of OMPs across UK HEIs
Weeks full salary replacement Number of packages %
0 15 7.0
4 51 23.8
6 27 12.6
8 38 17.8
9 5 2.3
10 1 0.5
12 3 1.4
13 9 4.2
14 2 0.9
16 14 6.5
17 1 0.5
18 37 17.3
19 1 0.5
18 See Appendix XX for a break down all packages by HEIs.
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20 3 1.4
26 7 3.3
Total 214 100.0
Table 1 shows that there is large variance of generosity across UK universities, with 15
packages that do not top up statutory care, a large number (51) of provisions that grant up
to 4 weeks of full pay, and only 7 HEIs that provide mothers with up to 6 months of full
salary replacement. It seems surprising that UK HEIs have implemented very different
maternity provisions given that more or less generous packages imply a huge variation in
costs for universities.
We also collected and calculated slightly different measures of generosity for robustness
purposes. First we looked at the number of weeks salary replacement is granted, either fully
or partially. Second we calculated an often used measure that allows more easy comparison
across benefits, the so called full weeks’ equivalent which estimates the full monetary value
of the payed maternity benefits.19 Table 2 shows these different measures.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Generosity Measures
N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Weeks with full salary replacement 214 9.7 6.5 0.0 26
Full weeks’ equivalent 210 18.4 3.9 7.1 39
Weeks of salary replacement 214 18.7 6.9 0.0 52
We use all three measures as dependent variables in the subsequent analyses. Weeks of full
salary replacement and full weeks’ equivalent clearly measure the overall generosity of a
19 This measure sums the weeks with full pay, plus all partial pay, plus weeks of statutory maternity pay. In
the UK SMP grants 90% of the average weekly earnings (before tax) for the first 6 weeks and the lower of
£140.98 or 90% of the average weekly earnings for the next 33 weeks. We measure average earnings as
average female salary per institution.
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maternity package and are highly correlated (0.84). The number of weeks for which some
salary replacement is granted seems to be a less precise measure of generosity since a
package could offer many weeks with very low pay or only a few weeks with full salary
replacement. In this case the former case would receive a higher value than the latter. This
variable thus covaries to a lesser extend with weeks of full salary replacement (0.3) and
full weeks’ equivalent (0.5).
In order to explain generosity of maternity benefits we include the above discussed
university characteristics, research intensity, and membership in an association. Most HEIs
majorly adjusted their occupational maternity packages between 2008 and 2013 after the
last round of modifications in the UK statutory provisions was implemented on 1st April
2007 when the flat rate payment period was extended from 20 to 33 weeks20. We therefor
measure university characteristics that should affect maternity provisions but not vice versa
co-temporarily in 2013. These variables include staff costs, and income from research
grants, total income. In order to avoid potential endogeneity, particularly reversed causality
issues we measure variables that affect decisions on generosity but potentially are also
determined by generosity in the year before each university implemented changes. For
example, if the maternity policies were changed in 2008 we look at these variables in 2007.
These factors comprise total number of staff, ratio of female academic to admin staff, share
of female professors, share of female academics at child bearing age (under 40 years), the
20 This was the last major change in statutory maternity pay, in 2009 additional provisions for fathers were
implemented and in 2015 shared parental leave was introduced with no changes to the actual monetary value
of the parental leave benefits.
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student-to-staff ratio, and the research intensity measured as overall RAE score in 200821.
We use the share of male professors, share of female senior managers, and the share of
female administrative staff at child bearing age (under 40) as placebo test. Given our
bargaining argument, these groups should not be able to affect maternity provisions. Or
alternatively the university management has no incentives to provide these groups with
their preferred maternity option. For robustness we also look at these variables uniformly
in 2006, 2005, and 2004 - before the last major change in statutory provisions in 2007 (table
7). Table 3 depicts some descriptive measures for these variables.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Other RHS Variables
Measured in year before last changes in
OMP
N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Total number of staff 212 2749.67 2537.78 105 12600
Share of female staff 212 0.55 0.05 0.38 0.71
Ratio of female academic/admin staff 212 0.72 0.42 0.05 4.36
Share of female full professors 212 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
Share of female academics under 40 212 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.26
Staff costs per income (2013) 209 52.64 6.66 2.22 69.10
Income from research grants in mill. GBP
(2013)
213 37.79 75.93 0.00 428.80
Total income in mill GBP (2013) 209 208.27 222.14 6.68 1438.24
Student to staff ratio 212 16.27 4.64 1.40 31.20
RAE Score 2008 213 110.60 36.62 0.00 318.03
Share of male full professors 212 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.08
Share of female senior managers 212 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
Share of female admin staff under 40 212 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.47
4.c. Empirical Specification
21 We also use the share of 4* submission but the results do not change and this variable is very highly
correlated with the overall RAE score.
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We test the 9 Hypotheses derived above empirically with data on generosity of maternity
provisions collected for 160 UK HEIs. Our main measure of generosity is the number
weeks with full salary replacement granted by the occupational maternity package. Since
this is a count variable, a Poisson or Negative binomial model potentially represent
adequate estimation choices22. However, weeks of full salary replacement is not typically
Poisson distributed, which would imply many observations for smaller values decreasing
with higher values, e.g. fewer universities grant 16 or 18 weeks of full salary replacement.
We therefore estimate also a Negative binomial model and test whether there is significant
over-dispersion (this seems to be the case). In addition, hypothesis 9 implies that dispersion
of generosity is not equal across university groups but smaller within more homogeneous
associations with clear research goals (e.g. Russell Group and Golden Triangle). We thus
also employ a generalized negative binomial model which allows dispersion to be different
across groups and directly estimated. We first present a set of baseline results for the main
hypotheses. We subsequently look at whether these findings remain robust when using
alternative measures for generosity, when introducing placebo tests and looking at RHS
variables for different years prior to changes in OMPs.
4.d. Baseline Results
We start to present different specifications for a direct test of the main hypotheses derived
from our theoretical discussion. Table 4 presents these baseline estimation results. Models
1 and 5 present our preferred Negative binomial specification that seems to be appropriate
22 We use a (potentially misspecified) OLS model as benchmark, esp. given that the DV is not typically
Poisson distributed.
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given that the variance is significantly overdispersed (model 1 – alpha, Chi2). Models 2 and
3 show that the results remain strongly robust when using other (less appropriate)
estimators such as simple OLS (model 3) and Poisson (model 2) that – in our case wrongly
- assumes equidispersion (mean=variance). Model 4 tests hypothesis 8 directly by allowing
dispersion to be heterogeneous across different peer university groups.
Table 4: Explaining the Generosity of Maternity Provisions across UK HEIs
DV: WEEKS OF FULL SALARY
REPLACEMENT
1
NEGBIN
2
POISSON
3
OLS
4
G_NEGBIN
5
NEGBIN
TOTAL STAFF IN 1000S 0.081* 0.076* 0.872* 0.045 0.087*
(BC OMP) (0.048) (0.041) (0.485) (0.032) (0.049)
RATIO AC/ADMIN FEMALES -0.456*** -0.458*** -2.832*** -0.511*** -0.536***
(BC OMP) (0.162) (0.166) (0.801) (0.157) (0.160)
SHARE OF FEMALE PROFS 28.687*** 24.373*** 282.903*** 23.337*** 32.190***
(BC OMP) (7.410) (6.575) (65.638) (6.029) (6.550)
FEMALE ACADEMICS U 40 3.841*** 3.864*** 24.652** 4.164*** 4.380***
(BC OMP) (1.405) (1.345) (10.535) (1.342) (1.461)
RATIO STAFFCOSTS/INCOME -0.004 -0.003 -0.068 -0.004 -0.004
(2013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.067) (0.011) (0.009)
INCOME FROM RESEARCH- -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002*
GRANTS (IN MILL. £ 2013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001)
TOTAL INCOME IN MILL. £ 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(2013) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001)
STUDENT TO STAFF RATIO -0.022* -0.018 -0.153 -0.009 -0.015
(BC_OMP) (0.012) (0.013) (0.093) (0.013) (0.013)
RAE SCORE (2008) 0.005*** 0.003** 0.035*** 0.004*** 0.004**(0.002) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002)
DIFFERENT PACKAGES -0.449*** -0.456*** -4.851*** -0.425*** -0.458***(0.074) (0.071) (0.641) (0.067) (0.075)
SCOTTLAND 0.363*** 0.295*** 3.120*** 0.355***(0.109) (0.103) (1.135) (0.113)
NORTHERN IRELAND 0.381** 0.361** 4.584** 0.333**(0.173) (0.157) (2.015) (0.169)
WALES -0.025 -0.092 -0.577 -0.058(0.219) (0.156) (1.614) (0.223)
POST 1992, NOT -0.528***
POLYTECHNIQUES (0.145)
SHARE OF FEMALE STAFF -2.082**
(BC_OMP) (0.953)
INTERCEPT 2.260*** 2.426*** 12.835*** 2.399*** 3.410***(0.479) (0.506) (3.978) (0.605) (0.731)
DISPERSION (LN_ALPHA)
RUSSELL GROUP -2.182**
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(0.979)
GOLDEN TRIANGLE -10.823***(0.201)
INTERCEPT -1.690*** -1.407*** -1.753***(0.205) (0.201) (0.205)
N 208 208 208 208 208
R2 (PSEUDO) 0.082 0.218 0.442 0.102 0.086
ALPHA 0.185 0.173
CHI2 132.620ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES, * P≤0.1, ** P≤0.05, *** P≤0.01, BC OMP = YEARBEFORE THE LAST CHANGE IN OCCUPATIONAL MATERNITY PACKAGE
The empirical results lend ample support to several of our derived hypotheses. In terms of
size effects (H4), HEIs with a larger number of employees do tend to provide more
generous maternity provisions, yet the financial resources available do not affect
occupational maternity pay (H3)23. This is in line with our argument above, that resources
in terms of staff size should play a bigger role than income. This also defeats the general
belief that richer universities provide better parental leave policies, if anything, they are
less generous in their provisions. The question whether the student-to-staff ratio affects the
decision on granting more or less generous maternity pay (H6) can be answered tentatively
positive. All coefficients point in the right direction and are marginally significant. This
supports the argument that when individual staff have to teach and advise more students,
replacement is harder and thus fewer weeks of full salary are offered. Our estimation results
show that the pure existence of female staff does not affect maternity provisions positively
but rather negatively because it increases overall costs (model 5). However, as predicted, a
previously large share of female professors affects the generosity of maternity benefits
23 We look at total income, as well as net income but results remain insignificant.
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positively (H1). This points to the observation that if women are in decision making
positions, family policies become more important and support for female academics
increases. Interestingly, also the previous share of female academics at child bearing age
(under 40 years) increases the generosity of maternity pay (H2). Two interpretations seem
likely: first, there might be a lobbying effect, so as discussed the bargaining power of
female academics increases, and second, university managers might be aware that they
could lose a large share of their academic staff if there are many women at child bearing
age. We also find strong support that more research intensive (measured as RAE score)
universities have stronger incentives to keep productive academics and thus reward them
with more generous maternity benefits (H7). More generous benefits should allow female
academics to stay in touch with research without the continuous burden of teaching and
administrative duties due to the prolonged and more generous maternity pay.
In addition, we do not find confirmation that the ratio of female academic staff to female
administrative staff pushed generosity of maternity pay up, but it significantly decreases
this generosity (H5). This result is somewhat surprising, though the substantive effects
remain very small. Potential costs that increase exponentially with the rate of female
academic staff could explain this finding. The discussed skill specificity does not only
mean that female academics a hard to replace but also hard to get rid of. We also argued
that bargaining power increases with the share of female full professors and the share of
female academics at child bearing age and not in the size of this group in general.
The generalized negative binomial specification (model 4) allows us to some extend to
evaluate the peer group effects (H8). We find two results that are consistent with our
argument. First, the dispersion of the generosity of benefits is significantly smaller for
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Russell Group members as well as for universities that belong to the Golden Triangle.
These universities are leading in terms of research intensity and therefore offer more
generous maternity pay. They are also relatively more homogeneous in their goals and thus
provide very similar packages with high generosity levels24. Second, we find that new
universities that were founded after 1992 and had not been previously polytechnics in
general grant less generous maternity pay but their packages still vary across group
members. This is a due to the heterogeneous nature of this association that includes all
post-1992 non-polytechnics. In addition, these newly founded universities are mostly
teaching institutions since they don’t have the permission to award research degrees such
as PhDs and are thus much less research oriented.25
We have established that most of our hypotheses are supported by the evidence, yet in order
to understand whether these effects are substantial we need to investigate the size of these
effects. We use the estimates of the Negative Binomial model (table4, model 1) to assess
the economic relevance of these effects. Figure one displays the combined effect of the
research intensity of a university (x-axis) and the student to staff ratio (small – black, large
– grey)26. We can see that that research intense universities with a small student to staff
ratio are 5 times as generous in their maternity provisions as compared to teaching oriented
HEIs with a large student to staff ratio. Also the positive effect of research strength is much
stronger at institutions with a more favorable student to staff ratio. While teaching
24 These results come from the specification of the dispersion equation in the generalized negbin model.
25 We ran comparative models with different combinations of all other group memberships – see appendix
but did not find any additional significant results and thus are not reporting the findings here. However the
significant relationships we found are fully consistent with our argument.
26 Small = 2, large=29
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institutions with a high student to staff ratio offer close to the observed minimal generosity
(5 weeks of full salary replacement), the most research intense universities with a small
student to staff ratio are predicted to offer close to the observed maximum – 25 weeks of
full salary27.
Figure 1: Predicted Weeks of Full Salary Replacement dependent on Student-Staff Ratio
and Research Intensity
We can observe similar combined effects for the previous share of female professors and
the share of academic women at child bearing age (figure 2). Again the predicted number
of weeks with full salary replacement is more than 5 times larger at institutions with a large
27 All other explanatory variable are fixed at their sample means for prediction.
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share of both groups of female academics pointing to their increased bargaining power.
Especially when the share of female professors is minimal the predicted generosity only
varies between 3 and 8 weeks of full salary replacement.
Figure 2: Predicted Weeks of Full Salary Replacement dependent on Research Intensity
and Previous Share of Female Professors
Based on the factors we are taking into account to explain institutional generosity of
maternity pay, we compare the predictions to the actually observed number of weeks with
full salary replacement and discuss some interesting discrepancies. For example, given
their research intensity, student to staff ration, share of female professors and female
academics at child bearing age, income etc. the university of Nottingham should offer 18
weeks of full pay but only offers 8 weeks – a stark discrepancy. Similarly our model over-
estimates the expected generosity of the LSE (21 weeks predicted, vs. 18 weeks offered),
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Warwick university (20 vs. 16), Liverpool (12 vs. 8), Glasgow (25 vs. 16) and UCL (23 vs.
18). Contrarily some universities are more generous than expected. For example,
Southampton should offer 18 weeks of full pay given its characteristics but grants 26 weeks
of full salary replacement. We find similar results for the LBS (14 predicted, 18 offered),
and Oxford (22 predicted and 26 offered). These findings do not suggest any normative
conclusions but empirically show that these institutions either over- or underprovide given
their measurable characteristics. For a large number of universities our simple baseline
model makes exact predictions: Cambridge (18), Aberdeen (18), Lancaster (18), Leeds
(16), Strathclyde (16), Northampton (6), Winchester (6), Cumbria (6), and the London
University of Arts (4) amongst others.
4.e. Alternative Generosity measures
We use the other two measures of generosity (full weeks’ equivalent and weeks of full and
partial salary replacement) as robustness checks. Table 5 presents the estimation results
Table 5: Alternative Measures of Maternity Benefit Generosity
WEEKS OF SALARY
REPLACEMENT: FULL
TIME EQUIVALENT
WEEKS OF SALARY
REPLACEMENT (FULL
AND PARTIAL)
NEGBIN OLS NEGBIN OLS
TOTAL STAFF IN 1000S (BC OMP) 0.016 0.323 0.007 0.210(0.015) (0.294) (0.027) (0.456)
RATIO AC/ADMIN FEMALES -0.130*** -2.165*** -0.204** -3.259**
(BC OMP) (0.041) (0.637) (0.097) (1.346)
SHARE OF FEMALE PROFESSORS 6.595*** 129.670*** 5.754 109.000
(BC OMP) (2.149) (41.613) (3.937) (73.773)
FEMALE ACADEMICS UNDER 40 1.018** 17.329** 1.156 19.285
(BC OMP) (0.419) (7.521) (1.132) (18.801)
RATIO STAFFCOSTS/INCOME 0.001 0.012 0.010 0.139
(2013) (0.002) (0.040) (0.008) (0.096)
INCOME FROM RESEARCHGRANTS -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.007
(IN MILL. £ 2013) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) (0.017)
TOTAL INCOME IN MILL. £ (2013) 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.003(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.008)
STUDENT TO STAF RATIO -0.010*** -0.166*** -0.020** -0.331**
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(BC_OMP) (0.004) (0.060) (0.008) (0.131)
RAE SCORE (2008) 0.001 0.016* 0.001 0.013(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.017)
DIFFERENT PACKAGES -0.103*** -1.966*** 0.043 1.070(0.028) (0.530) (0.061) (1.153)
SCOTTLAND 0.095*** 1.801*** 0.062 1.125(0.031) (0.586) (0.082) (1.579)
NORTHERN IRELAND 0.055 1.144 -0.151 -2.529(0.042) (0.855) (0.195) (3.063)
WALES 0.069 1.363 -0.004 0.366(0.074) (1.520) (0.146) (2.825)
INTERCEPT 2.921*** 18.900*** 2.543*** 13.911***(0.131) (2.298) (0.384) (4.734)
N 208 208 208 208
R2 (PSEUDO) 0.051 0.348 0.020 0.141
ALPHA 0.000 0.094ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES, * P≤0.1, ** P≤0.05, *** P≤0.01, BC OMP =YEAR BEFORE THE LAST CHANGE IN OCCUPATIONAL MATERNITY PACKAGE
First, if we look at full weeks’ equivalent – which is very closely related to weeks with full
salary replacement – we find exactly the same results as discussed before, both in size and
significance which lends more robust support to our claims28. Second, the results differ in
interesting but predictable ways for the other measure – full and partial salary replacement.
This measure is often used in cross-country analysis because it is usually easy to collect
but does not really capture generosity since it gives higher values to schemes that grant
very limited amounts of money for a large number of weeks, like the statutory pay in the
UK which only offers £140.98 but for 33 weeks. In this case only the student to staff ratio
significantly affects the outcome – this is a pure cost indicator. This goes along with our
argument that generosity is important for research oriented universities that want to allow
female academics to climb the career ladder to full professorship. In addition, the overall
28 Only the number of total staff turns out to be not significant anymore.
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explanatory power (R2) halved for these models lending further support to the conclusion
that other factors predict maternity provisions that are not related to generosity.
4.f. Robustness and Placebo Tests
We run the same specification as in table 4 (model 1) but adding some additional variables
to the right-hand-side in order to a) see whether our results are robust to the inclusion of
additional factors, and b) understand whether those factors that we predicted not to have
an effect in our theoretical discussion indeed turn out to be statistically insignificant. We
also call this a placebo test. Specifically, we want to test whether senior male academics
can or have an interest to influence the process and we find that this is not the case
confirming our expectation. We also argued that the decisive groups in the bargaining
process are female professors and female academics at child bearing age because of the
skill specificity of their jobs and the universities investment in their recruitment and
productivity. We thus posit that it should not make a difference for generosity if there is a
large share of senior female managers or female administrators at child bearing age, and
we find exactly this. All other results correspond closely in direction, significance, and size
to our baseline findings. Estimation results can be found in table 6.
Table 6: Placebo Tests – Effect of Male Professors and Female Administrators
DV: WEEKS OF FULL SALARY
REPLACEMENT
1
NEGBIN
2
NEGBIN
3
NEGBIN
TOTAL STAFF IN 1000S (BC OMP) 0.089* 0.090* 0.088*(0.047) (0.047) (0.045)
RATIO AC/ADMIN FEMALES (BC OMP) -0.370** -0.380* -0.307(0.187) (0.194) (0.236)
SHARE OF FEMALE PROFS (BC OMP) 21.183** 21.208** 19.253*(10.015) (9.940) (10.207)
FEMALE ACADEMICS U 40(BC OMP) 3.125* 3.273* 3.267*(1.624) (1.778) (1.785)
RATIO STAFFCOSTS/INCOME (2013) -0.006 -0.006 -0.005(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
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INCOME FROM RESEARCHGRANTS -0.002* -0.002* -0.002*
(IN MILL. £ 2013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TOTAL INCOME IN MILL. £ (2013) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
STUDENT TO STAFF RATIO (BC_OMP) -0.019 -0.018 -0.016(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
RAE SCORE (2008) 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DIFFERENT PACKAGES -0.447*** -0.446*** -0.445***(0.077) (0.077) (0.077)
SHARE OF MALE PROFESSORS (BC OMP) 5.536 5.644 6.462(4.375) (4.318) (4.555)
SHARE OF SENIOR FEMALE 3.650 3.021
MANAGERS (BC OMP) (9.455) (9.400)
FEMALE ADMINISTRATORS 0.885
UNDER 40 (BC OMP) (0.979)
SCOTTLAND 0.341*** 0.339*** 0.353***(0.113) (0.114) (0.116)
NORTHERN IRELAND 0.382** 0.388** 0.401**(0.164) (0.163) (0.166)
WALES -0.076 -0.069 -0.075(0.222) (0.224) (0.223)
INTERCEPT 2.293*** 2.266*** 1.999***(0.498) (0.503) (0.580)
N 208 208 208
R2 (PSEUDO) 0.084 0.084 0.084
ALPHA 0.179 0.179 0.177ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES, * P≤0.1, ** P≤0.05, *** P≤0.01, BC OMP =YEAR BEFORE THE LAST CHANGE IN OCCUPATIONAL MATERNITY PACKAGE
Finally we examine whether the year in which the potentially endogenous explanatory
variables are measured changes the estimation results. Models 1, 2, and 3 in table 7 use the
same specification as our baseline model but measure the relevant right-hand-side variables
in the years 2006, 2005, and 2004 – all prior to the last major changes in statutory benefits.
While models 4 and 5 show results with measurements for the RHS variables in 2006 but
with the alternative specifications of the dependent variable (weeks with full time
equivalent pay and weeks with partial and full salary replacement).
Table 7: Different RHS Years and Alternative DVs
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DV: WEEKS OF FULL SALARY
REPLACEMENT
2006
NEGBIN
2005
NEGBIN
2004
NEGBIN
2006
FT-
EQUIVAL
ENT
2006
WEEKS
SR
TOTAL STAFF IN 1000S 0.093** 0.084** 0.078* 0.025** 0.001(0.037) (0.041) (0.044) (0.011) (0.028)
RATIO AC/ADMIN FEMALES -0.261 -0.162 -0.032 -0.099 -0.145(0.207) (0.212) (0.180) (0.068) (0.107)
SHARE OF FEMALE PROFS 30.631*** 32.706*** 33.260*** 7.131*** 6.621(8.841) (8.533) (9.009) (2.390) (4.327)
FEMALE ACADEMICS U 40 4.131** 2.226 1.544 1.264** 2.150(1.719) (1.745) (1.647) (0.550) (1.376)
RATIO STAFFCOSTS/INCOME -0.006 -0.030** -0.029** -0.000 0.008
(2013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.003) (0.009)
INCOME FROM RESEARCH- -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
GRANTS (IN MILL. £ 2013) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
TOTAL INCOME IN MILL. £ 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(2013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
STUDENT TO STAFF RATIO -0.024* -0.006 -0.003(0.013) (0.004) (0.010)
RAE SCORE (2008) 0.005*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.001 0.001(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
DIFFERENT PACKAGES -0.443*** -0.448*** -0.428*** -0.103*** 0.038(0.075) (0.075) (0.078) (0.028) (0.060)
SCOTTLAND 0.394*** 0.397*** 0.407*** 0.097*** 0.076(0.122) (0.119) (0.119) (0.032) (0.079)
NORTHERN IRELAND 0.384** 0.441*** 0.473*** 0.050 -0.149(0.181) (0.170) (0.163) (0.040) (0.190)
WALES -0.002 -0.010 0.017 0.067 0.014(0.162) (0.155) (0.148) (0.064) (0.142)
INTERCEPT 2.163*** 2.216*** 2.200*** 2.866*** 2.290***(0.511) (0.500) (0.486) (0.146) (0.435)
N 209 206 203 209 209
R2 (PSEUDO) 0.084 0.088 0.084 0.048 0.013
ALPHA 0.184 0.169 0.179 0.000 0.101ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES, * P≤0.1, ** P≤0.05, *** P≤0.01
The results in table 7 largely confirm the findings in the baseline model as well as the
models with alternative specifications of the dependent variable. Since the bulk of changes
in occupational maternity benefits occurred between 2008 and 2012 the measures from
2006 seem to best explain the implemented changes in OMP. This confirms our
expectations that the process of consultation regarding changes in occupational maternity
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happens shortly before new maternity provisions are issued by a university. If we move
further into the past (2005, 2004) some of the effects lose statistical significance, e.g. the
share of female academics at child bearing age. However, the overall effects remain
remarkably stable, adding to the notion that our findings are robust towards different
specifications and inclusion of variables.
5. Discussion
UK higher education institutions vary greatly in the generosity of the occupational
maternity pay they grant to their employees. We find that much of this variation can be
explained with a bargaining model in mind that distinguishes between the factors that
determine the bargaining power of female academics, the incentives for universities to
invest in the retention of female talent, and the costs imposed by generous maternity
provisions. Differences in the structural characteristics of these institutions comparable to
other areas like corporations and companies in the manufacturing or service sectors
contribute to these different dimensions. The sheer size in terms of employees but also
structural factors such as the student-to-staff ratio help to account for differences in
generosity because these features describe how potential costs of mothers taking time out
can be redistributed across other staff members. Interestingly, size in terms of overall
income does not help to explain maternity benefits. Thus it seems that decisions on
maternity benefits are much more intentional and depend on the bargaining power of
female academics specifically, but also on the strategic goals universities pursue. One of
the driving factors behind the design of maternity pay is the research orientation of the HEI
in question. Highly research intense institutions have a vested interest in keeping
productive mothers in whom they have invested resources both at the hiring stage as well
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as during their employment at the university. Better maternity provisions are seen as a
reward and a means to keep mothers productive and satisfied with a work environment that
allows them to dedicate time to their research. The rigorous hiring process serves as
screening device at research intense HEIs.
The bargaining power of female academics who can affect the process of deciding over
maternity benefits is mainly strengthened by the share of female professors in place when
decision are made and the share of female academics at child bearing age. Female
professors are similar to women in executive positions in other sectors and can influence
policy outcomes at universities. The number female academics at child bearing age
increases the probability that the university loses many talented and productive women in
whom they have invested if maternity provisions are sparse.
We also argue – and empirically confirm – that the same logic is not at play for female
administrators because they are a) easier to replace, b) they share is generally large, and c)
the university’s investment in administrative staff is comparatively lower. Neither the share
of female senior managers nor female administrators at child bearing age, therefor are able
to influence maternity provisions.
6. Conclusion
Maternity and parental policies are costly and their costs and benefits are widely debated
beyond the normative aspect of allowing women to have children without sacrificing their
professional careers. Understanding how and why institutions decide to implement certain
levels of maternity pay generosity may help to unpack these potential costs and benefits of
maternity pay. This work suggests that both structural characteristics but also strategic
goals of universities, and the bargaining power of affected employees help explaining the
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generosity of maternity pay across UK higher education institution and that research-
intensive universities have much stronger incentives to implement generous maternity pay
provisions. From this follows that the potential benefits of maternity provisions might be
stronger for such institutions.
Research shows that maternity and parental policies are crucial to keep women talents in
the labor market, reduce the pay gap and allow women to climb the career ladder (Ginther
and Kahn 2003, 2004; Waldfogel 1998; Mason and Goulden 2004). Our work highlights
the institutional-based constraints and incentives offered to women in the UK academic
sector and represents a first step in unpacking the causes and consequences of generous
maternity benefits. In companion research, we investigate how differences in maternity
benefits affect productivity, career paths, pay, and job satisfaction of female academics.
From our perspective, the UK higher education sector provides fertile ground for such
investigations because maternity benefits vary widely across universities and the
productivity and career paths can be measured straightforwardly at the individual level. We
believe that the implications of our research extend beyond higher education institution and
offer insights on the determinants of the under-representation of women in qualified and
competitive sectors. Finally, given that the generosity of statutory maternity pay in the UK
is one of the lowest across EU countries, our research can help inform policy reforms in
this area.
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Appendix
Table A1: Generosity of Occupational Maternity Pay across UK HEIs
Weeks with
full salary
replacement
Number
of
packages
HEI
0 15 Anglia Ruskin University, Conservatoire for Dance and
Drama, Edge Hill University, Falmouth University, Guildhall
School of Music and Drama, Leeds College of Music, Leeds
Metropolitan University, Norwich University of the Arts,
Queen Margaret University (Edinburgh), Ravensbourne,
Royal Agricultural University, The University of Bolton
4 51 Bath Spa University, Bishop Grosseteste University,
Buckinghamshire New University, Canterbury Christ Church
University, Cardiff Metropolitan University, Central School
of Speech and Drama, Coventry University, Falmouth
University, Harper Adams University, Leeds Trinity
University, Liverpool Hope University, Liverpool John
Moores University, London Metropolitan University, London
South Bank University, Rose, Bruford College, Royal
Academy of Music, Royal College of Music, Royal Northern
College of Music, St Mary's University College, St Mary's
University College (Twickenham), Stranmillis University
College, Teesside University, The Liverpool Institute for
Performing Arts, The University of Chichester, The
University of Huddersfield, The University of Lincoln, The
University of Northumbria at Newcastle, The University of
Plymouth, The University of Portsmouth, The University of
Wales (Newport), The University of West London, The
University of Wolverhampton, The University of Worcester,
Trinity Laban Conservatoire of Music and Dance, University
for the Creative Arts, University of Bedfordshire, University
of Chester, University of Glamorgan, University of
Gloucestershire, University of Hertfordshire, University of St
Mark and St John, University of the Arts (London)
6 27 Anglia Ruskin University, Bournemouth University, De
Montfort University, Falmouth University, Newman
University, Roehampton University, Royal Conservatoire of
Scotland, Southampton Solent University, Staffordshire
University, Swansea Metropolitan University, The Arts
University Bournemouth, The Arts University Bournemouth,
The City University, The Manchester Metropolitan
University, The Nottingham Trent University, The University
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of Bradford, The University of Brighton, The University of
Northampton, The University of Westminster, The University
of Winchester, University of Cumbria, University of Derby,
University of the West of England (Bristol), Writtle College,
York St John University
8 38 Aberystwyth University, Bangor University, Birmingham
City University, Brunel University, Cranfield University,
Goldsmiths College, Heriot-Watt University, Imperial College
of Science Technology and Medicine, St George's Hospital
Medical School, Swansea University, The Royal Veterinary
College, The University of Bath, The University of Bristol,
The University of Dundee, The University of East Anglia, The
University of Edinburgh, The University of Essex, The
University of Exeter, The University of Glasgow, The
University of Hull, The University of Kent, The University of
Leeds, The University of Leicester, The University of
Liverpool, The University of Nottingham, The University of
Stirling, The University of Strathclyde, The University of
Surrey, The University of Sussex, The University of Warwick,
The University of the West of Scotland, University Campus
Suffolk, University of Durham, University of London
9 5 Courtauld Institute of Art, London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine, The University of Aberdeen, University
College London
10 1 The University of East London
12 3 Aston University, Sheffield Hallam University, The
University of Sheffield
13 9 Edinburgh Napier University, Glynd?r University, Oxford
Brookes University, The Manchester Metropolitan University,
The Robert Gordon University, The University of Central
Lancashire, The University of Surrey, University of Abertay
Dundee
14 2 The Institute of Cancer Research, The University of
Sunderland
16 14 Glasgow School of Art, Imperial College of Science,
Technology and Medicine, Institute of Education, The
University of Bristol, The University of Edinburgh, The
University of Glasgow, The University of Kent, The
University of Leeds, The University of St Andrews, The
University of Stirling, The University of Strathclyde, The
University of Warwick, The University of the West of
Scotland, University of Durham
17 1 Heriot-Watt University
18 37 Brunel University, Cardiff University, Courtauld Institute of
Art, Edinburgh College of Art, Heythrop College, Imperial
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College of Science, Technology and Medicine, King's College
London, Liverpool Hope University, London Business
School, London School of Economics and Political Science,
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine,
Loughborough University, Middlesex University, Queen
Mary University of London, Royal Holloway and Bedford
New College, The Open University, The Queen's University
of Belfast, The School of Oriental and African Studies, The
University of Aberdeen, The University of Birmingham, The
University of Cambridge, The University of East London, The
University of Hull
The University of Keele, The University of Lancaster, The
University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, The University of
Reading, The University of Salford, The University of
Sheffield, The University of Sussex, The University of York,
University College London, University of Ulster, University
of the Highlands and Islands
19 1 Glasgow Caledonian University
20 3 Kingston University, The University of Greenwich
26 7 Aston University, Birkbeck College, Royal College of Art,
Scottish Agricultural College, The University of Manchester,
The University of Oxford, The University of Southampton
